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1.  Reception Conditions Directive (recast): Relevance in 
Times of High Numbers of Asylum Applications 
 
 
Lieneke Slingenberg 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since 2012, the European Union has been faced with an increase in asylum appli-
cations. In 2014, the total number of asylum applications1 remained (just) below 
the total number of asylum applications submitted in 1992,2 which was hitherto 
the peak year of submitted asylum applications in the EU. In 2015, 1,3 million 
asylum applications were submitted in the EU,3 which is almost double the num-
ber of 1992. As a result of these high numbers, the systems meant for the recep-
tion of asylum seekers in many Member States are under increasing pressure.4 
As a reaction to these developments, Member States have started pursuing 
more restrictive policies with regard to the reception of asylum seekers. Asylum 
seekers have had to live in sports facilities or tent camps for prolonged periods of 
time5 or were offered no accommodation at all;6 cash benefits were replaced by 
benefits in kind;7 and children had to wait for months before they received ac-
cess to education.8 Some of these policies were caused by force majeure, 
whereas other policies were explicitly intended to deter asylum seekers. 
                                                                      
1  In 2014, 627.780 asylum applications were submitted in the EU. Source: Eurostat.  
2  In 1992, 672 thousand asylum applications were submitted in the, then, 15 Member 
States of the EU. Source: Eurostat.  
3  Source: Eurostat.  
4  This pressure is not the same in all Member States; some Member States have received a 
much higher number of asylum applications than others. E.g. in 2015, Germany received 
476,620 asylum applications, which is 35% of the total number of asylum applications 
submitted in the EU. Hungary received 177,135 asylum applications, a share of 13,9%. Es-
tonia, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iceland and Liechtenstein 
all received less than 1,000 asylum applications in 2015. Source: Eurostat.  
5  See e.g. for the Netherlands: Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 32 317/34 215, nr. FD.  
6  See e.g. for Greece: Asylum Information Database, Country Report Greece, November 
2015, p. 74, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-down-
load/aida_gr_update.iv_.pdf.  
7  See e.g. for Germany: Asylum Information Database, Country Report Germany, November 
2015, p. 50-51, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-
download/aida_de_update.iv__0.pdf; for Finland: Government Action Plan on Asylum 
Policy, 8 December 2015, available at: http://valtioneuvosto.fi/en/article/-/asset_publish-
er/hallitus-julkisti-turvapaikkapoliittisen-toimenpideohjelmansa?_101_INSTANCE_3qmU 
eJgIxZEK_groupId=10616.  
8  See e.g. for the Netherlands: Kamerstukken II, 2015/16, 34 334, nr. 3; and for the UK: ‘Chil-
dren seeking asylum in UK denied access to education’, The Guardian 2 February 2016, 
→ 
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When adopted in 2003, the EU Reception Conditions Directive was primarily 
a confirmation of existing policies in the (then 15) Member States. In the light of 
the latest developments with regard to the reception of asylum seekers, the 
(recast) Directive has gained renewed relevance: in determining the limits of 
restrictive policies; in establishing budget priorities; and in putting an end to a 
possible race to the bottom amongst Member States trying to be the least at-
tractive for new asylum seekers. In this contribution, the relevance of the Di-
rective in times of high numbers of asylum applications will be further examined.  
In doing this, this contribution will focus on three issues. First, since the Di-
rective provides for a subjective right to housing, food, clothing and a daily ex-
penses allowance for asylum seekers, it is important to establish the precise per-
sonal scope of the Directive. From which moment in time are Member States 
obliged to provide asylum seekers with these facilities? And do these obligations 
end if the asylum application is rejected and/or if the Member State is not re-
sponsible for examining the asylum application (para. 3)? A second relevant 
question is to what extent the Directive leaves room for exceptions on the basis 
of high numbers of asylum applications or saturation of reception networks (pa-
ra. 4). Thirdly, since in many Member States the length of the asylum procedure 
increases due to the large number of asylum applications, this chapter examines 
to what extent the Directive provides for an increase of rights through the mere 
passage of time (para. 5). First, the background of the Directive will be briefly 
outlined (para. 2).  
2. BACKGROUND 
The need to harmonize the standards on the reception of asylum seekers in EU 
Member States arose in the nineties of the last century in the context of an in-
creasing number of asylum seekers arriving in the European Union. The Europe-
an Commission urged Member States to harmonize their reception conditions 
for asylum seekers in order to prevent ‘secondary movements’ of asylum seek-
ers, i.e. movements towards the Member State with the most generous condi-
tions.9 At that time, all the (then 15) EU Member States had exclusionary aspects 
to their rules on the reception of asylum seekers,10 in order to deter potential 
                                                                      
available at: http://www.theguardian.com/society/2016/feb/02/children-seeking-asylum-
in-uk-denied-access-to-education.  
9  Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on the 
right of asylum’, Brussels 11 October 1991, SEC(91)1857 final, p 7. 
10  D. Mabbett and H. Bolderson, ‘Non-Discrimination, Free Movement, and Social Citizen-
ship in Europe: Contrasting Provisions for EU Nationals and Asylum-Seekers’, in: R. Sigg 
and C. Behrends (eds), Social Security in the Global Village, New Brunswick/London: 
Transaction Publishers 2002, p. 205. See also R. Bank, ‘Reception Conditions for Asylum 
Seekers in Europe: An Analysis of Provisions in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and 
the United Kingdom’, 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 2000, p. 259.  
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asylum seekers and stimulate voluntary return of rejected asylum seekers,11 but 
the content and scope of the exclusionary measures differed greatly. 
In 1999, the European Council decided in Tampere to work towards the es-
tablishment of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) including, in the 
short term, ‘common minimum conditions of reception of asylum seekers’.12 As 
one of the first components of the CEAS, Directive 2003/9/EC laying down mini-
mum standards for the reception of asylum seekers was adopted on 27 January 
2003.13 This directive deals with different aspects of the reception of asylum 
seekers, such as restrictions of freedom and detention, schooling, employment, 
material reception conditions, health care and special needs of vulnerable asy-
lum seekers. In a green paper on the future of the CEAS the Commission noted 
that the wide margin of discretion left to Member States by several key provi-
sions of this directive resulted in negating the desired harmonization effect. In 
addition, this wide margin of discretion has led to the establishment of low re-
ception standards, according to the Commission.14 
The Tampere conclusions provided for two phases for the development of 
the CEAS. Whereas in the short term, common minimum standards had to be 
adopted, in the longer term, ‘Community rules should lead to a common asylum 
procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum valid through-
out the Union’.15 As part of the second phase of the CEAS, the Commission is-
sued a proposal for a recast of Directive 2003/9 in December 2008, aimed at en-
suring a higher degree of harmonization and better standards of protection.16 In 
May 2009, the European Parliament adopted its position on the proposal which 
approved most of the proposed amendments.17 The Council documents on this 
                                                                      
11  R. Bank, ‘Reception Conditions for Asylum Seekers in Europe: An Analysis of Provisions in 
Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and the United Kingdom’, 69 Nordic Journal of Inter-
national Law 2000, p. 286-287; A. Bloch and L. Schuster, ‘Asylum and Welfare: Contem-
porary Debates’, 22 Critical Social Policy 2002, p. 401; M. Liedtke, ‘National Welfare and 
Asylum in Germany’, 22 Critical Social Policy 2002, p. 494; P.E. Minderhoud, ‘Asylum 
Seekers and Access to Social Security: Recent Developments in The Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Germany and Belgium’, in: A. Bloch and C. Levy (eds), Refugees, Citizenship and 
Social Policy in Europe, London: MacMillan Press 1999, p. 146; S. Rosenberger and A. 
König, ‘Welcoming the Unwelcome: The Politics of Minimum Reception Standards for 
Asylum Seekers in Austria’, Journal of Refugee Studies 2011, p. 1. 
12  Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October, Presidency Conclusions, available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm#c .   
13  Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards for the 
reception of asylum seekers, OJ 31/18.  
14  European Commission, Green Paper on the future Common European Asylum System, 
COM(2007) 301 final.  
15  Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, this aim has been 
laid down in article 78 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  
16  European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast), 
COM(2008) 815 final.  
17  EP-PE_TC1-COD(2008)0244. 
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proposal reveal, however, that the proposed changes encountered opposition 
from a significant number of Member States and no agreement was reached on 
this proposal. Delegations wanted ‘a better balance between, on the one hand, 
high standards of reception conditions for applicants for international protection 
and, on the other hand, the administrative and financial implications for Member 
States’.18  
The Commission presented a modified proposal for a recast of Directive 
2003/9 in June 2011.19 The Commission put forward that this modified proposal 
granted Member States more flexibility and latitude and better ensured that 
Member States have the tools to address cases where reception rules are abused 
and/or become pull factors. After difficult negotiations, Directive 2013/33 (here-
after: the Directive) was formally adopted on 26 June 2013 and entered into 
force upon its publication on 29 June 2013.20 Member States had to implement 
this Directive into their national laws before 21 July 2015.21 Due to the difficult 
negotiations in Council, the differences between Directive 2003/9 and Directive 
2013/33 are, with the exception of the provisions on detention, rather modest.22  
3. PERSONAL SCOPE OF THE DIRECTIVE 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the coming into force of Directive 2003/9/EC, Member States have been 
obliged to provide asylum seekers who fall under the Directive’s personal scope 
with housing, food, clothing, (‘material reception conditions’) and health care.23 
Member States can provide these facilities in kind, as financial allowances, in 
vouchers, or a combination of the three.24 Besides these provisions, Member 
States need to provide asylum seekers with a daily expenses allowance.25 The 
                                                                      
18  Council document 6394/1/12 REV 1, ASILE 24, at 1.  
19  European Commission, Amended proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast), 
COM(2011) 320 final.  
20  Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 lay-
ing down standards for the reception of applicants for international protection (recast), 
OJ L180/96. 
21  The Directive does not apply to the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark. For the Unit-
ed Kingdom, Directive 2003/9 will continue to apply. 
22  See further chapter 2 of this book. See also S. Peers, ‘Statewatch analasys. The EU Di-
rective on Reception Conditions: A weak compromise’ July 2012, available at: http://www. 
statewatch.org/analyses/no-184-reception-compromise.pdf.  
23  Arts. 13(1) in conjunction with Art. 2(j) and Art. 15(1) of Directive 2003/9/EC; Art. 17(1) in 
conjunction with Art. 2(g) and Art. 19 of Directive 2013/33/EU. 
24  Art. 13(5) of Directive 2003/9/EC; Art. 2(g) of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
25  Art. 2(j) of Directive 2003/9/EC; Art. 2(g) of Directive 2013/33/EU. See about the obligation 
to provide a daily expenses allowance: K. Groenendijk and L. Slingenberg, ‘Niet bij brood 
→ 
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Directive contains an exhaustive list of grounds for reduction or withdrawal of 
reception benefits e.g. if an asylum seeker does not comply with reporting du-
ties, abandons the place of residence determined by the competent authority 
without informing it, or breaches the rules of the accommodation centre.26 Due 
to the fact that this list is exhaustive, Member States are no longer free to deny 
assistance to categories of asylum seekers of their own choosing. These basic 
obligations for Member States have not been changed by the recast Directive. 
They provide for an important subjective right for asylum seekers; the right to be 
provided with (some kind of) housing, food, clothing, health care and a daily 
expenses allowance. 
It is, therefore, important to know who falls under the personal scope of the 
Directive and is entitled to these provisions. Who is an asylum seeker? As from 
which moment are Member States obliged to provide these facilities? From the 
moment an asylum seeker sets foot on the territory? Or once his asylum applica-
tion has been registered by the authorities? And until what moment do the obli-
gations apply in case the application is rejected? Until the final appeal is unsuc-
cessful? This section will try to answer these questions.  
Article 3(1) of the Directive reads: 
 
This Directive shall apply to all third-country nationals and stateless persons who 
make an application for international protection on the territory, including at the 
border, in the territorial waters or in the transit zones of a Member State, as long 
as they are allowed to remain on the territory as applicants, as well as to family 
members, if they are covered by such application for international protection ac-
cording to national law. 
  
For the definition of an ‘application for international protection’ the Directive 
refers to Article 2(h) of Directive 2011/95/EU.27 Accordingly, both applicants for 
refugee status and applicants for subsidiary protection fall under the scope of 
the Directive. This is an important change with regard to Directive 2003/9/EC 
which contained the possibility to exclude applicants for subsidiary protection.28 
Another difference with Directive 2003/9 is that Article 3 of Directive 2013/33 
explicitly refers to applications made in the territorial waters or in the transit 
zone of Member States. Such applications also fall under the Directive’s personal 
scope. An ‘applicant’ is defined as ‘a third-country national or a stateless person 
who has made an application for international protection in respect of which a 
final decision has not yet been taken’.29 Hence, in order to fall under the scope of 
Directive 2013/33, three important conditions have to be fulfilled: 
 
                                                                      
alleen. Onthouden dagvergoeding aan asielzoekers in noodopvang is onwettig’, A&MR 
2016, no. 2.  
26  Art. 16 of Directive 2003/9/EC; Art. 20 of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
27  Art. 2(a) Directive 2013/33/EU.  
28  Art. 2(b) and Art. 3(4) of Directive 2003/9/EC.  
29  Art. 2(b) of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
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1. An application for international protection must have been made; 
2. No final decision must have been taken on this application; and 
3. The applicant must be allowed to remain on the territory.30 
 
The Directive does not contain definitions of the terms used in these conditions. 
However, as part of the CEAS, the Directive needs to be interpreted in confor-
mity with the other instruments of the CEAS. Especially the recast of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive31 clarifies the meaning of these conditions. This (some-
times still rather unclear) meaning will be discussed in the following sections.  
3.2 Making, Registering or Lodging an Application 
An important question with regard to the Directive’s personal scope is from 
which moment in time are Member States obliged to provide asylum seekers 
with reception conditions? From the moment they state their intention to apply 
for asylum to the authorities, from the moment they are registered as asylum 
seekers, or from the moment they have formally lodged their asylum applica-
tion? In some Member States, state benefits are only provided to asylum seekers 
once they are registered as asylum seekers. When there are large numbers of 
simultaneous asylum applications, there is not always enough capacity to regis-
ter them all. In such cases, asylum seekers sometimes have to wait for weeks 
before they are provided with state benefits.32 This illustrates that it is important 
to know the precise moment when Member States’ obligations to provide bene-
fits to asylum seekers become activated.  
According to the English-language version, the Directive applies to third-
country nationals and stateless persons who make an application for interna-
tional protection. Other articles in this version of the Directive use the term 
lodge. For example, Article 5 on the right to information contains a time limit of 
15 days after an application is lodged.33 Also the French language version uses 
different terms in Article 3 (présentent une demande de protection) and Article 5 
                                                                      
30  This latter condition is also explicitly mentioned in the preamble of Directive 2013/33. 
Recital 8 holds: ‘In order to ensure equal treatment of applicants throughout the Union, 
this Directive should apply during all stages and types of procedures concerning applica-
tions for international protection, in all locations and facilities hosting applicants and for 
as long as they are allowed to remain on the territory of the Member States as applicants’ 
(emphasis added).  
31  Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
common procedures for granting and withdrawing international protection (recast), OJ 
L180/60.  
32  See for example Asylum Information Database, Country Report: Germany, November 
2015, p. 49, available at: http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/germany; Euro-
pean Council of Refugees, ‘Belgium restricts access to protection and leaves hundreds of 
asylum seekers without shelter’, 4 December 2015, available at: http://www.ecre.org/ 
component/content/article/70-weekly-bulletin-articles/1308-belgium-restricts-access-to-
protection-and-leaves-hundreds-of-asylum-seekers-without-shelter.html.  
33  Other examples of provisions that use the term lodge are Arts 6, 14 and 15.  
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(l’introduction de leur demande de protection). Other language versions use the 
same word in Articles 3 and 5, but use present tense in Article 3 and past tense or 
present perfect in Articles 5 and 6.34 This indicates that in order to fall under the 
personal scope of the Directive, it is not necessary to officially have lodged the 
application in conformity with national law.  
The question remains, however, which moment in time is then decisive for 
activating Member States’ obligations under the Directive. The moment an asy-
lum seeker sets foot on the territory and states his intention to apply for interna-
tional protection to the authorities? Or only after a first registration has taken 
place? The Asylum Procedures Directive contains some indications for this latter 
interpretation. Article 6 of this Directive distinguishes between making, register-
ing and lodging an asylum application. There are strict time limits for the regis-
tration of applications. Three working days after an asylum application has been 
made to the competent authorities, the application should be registered.35 This 
deadline is six working days if the application is made to other authorities which 
are likely to receive such applications, but not competent for the registration 
under national law.36 Where a large number of simultaneous applications for 
international protection make it very difficult in practice to respect these time 
limits, Member States may provide for an extension of the registration deadline 
to 10 working days.37 Registration of the application is not the same as lodging 
the application, as Article 6 also provides that Member States must ensure that a 
person who has made an application for international protection has an effective 
opportunity to lodge it as soon as possible.38 Member States may require that 
applications should be lodged in person and/or at a designated place.39  
Registration of the application is not mentioned in other provisions of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, nor in the Dublin Regulation or the Reception 
Conditions Directive and seems, therefore, not to have any legal effect. The 
strict registration time limits for Member States and the possibility of extending 
these time limits in case of large numbers of applications, however, suggest 
otherwise. If registration of the application had no legal effect, then the moment 
of registration would be irrelevant. Arguably, therefore, Member States are only 
obliged to provide reception conditions to asylum seekers once asylum seekers 
have registered their application. Depending on the situation and the compe-
tence of the authorities to whom an asylum seeker has stated his intention to 
apply for asylum, the maximum waiting period between stating this intention 
and its registration is 3 to 10 working days. An interpretation of the personal 
scope of the Reception Conditions Directive in conformity with Article 6 of the 
                                                                      
34  For example, the Dutch language version uses indienen in Art. 3, de indiening in Art. 5 and 
ingediend is in Art. 6. The Spanish language version similarly uses presenten in Art. 3, 
hayan presentado in Art. 5 and la presentación in Art. 6.  
35  Art. 6(1) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
36  Idem.  
37  Art. 6(5) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
38  Art. 6(2) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
39  Art. 6(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
LIENEKE SLINGENBERG 
 
16 
Asylum Procedures Directive, therefore, would be that asylum seekers fall under 
the personal scope as soon as their application is registered, and in any case no 
later than 3, or, depending on the situation, 6 or 10 working days after they have 
stated their intention to apply for asylum to the (competent) authorities. 
In order to fall under the Directive’s personal scope it is not necessary to 
make the application to the authorities of the Member State responsible for the 
examination of that application under the Dublin Regulation. In the first judg-
ment on Directive 2003/9,40 the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) 
ruled that Directive 2003/9 applies as soon as an application for asylum is first 
submitted41 to a Member State; not only once it is submitted to the authorities 
of the Member State responsible for the examination of that application. This 
has not been changed by the recast Directive and recast Dublin Regulation.  
3.3 Final Decision 
The first condition of the Directive’s personal scope deals with the start of Mem-
ber States’ obligations. The other two conditions deal with the end of it. An asy-
lum seeker only falls under the personal scope of the Directive as long as no final 
decision on his application has been taken. An important question, therefore, is 
what is considered to be a ‘final decision’ in the context of the Directive. The 
Directive does not contain a definition of this term. The Asylum Procedures Di-
rective defines ‘final decision’ as a ‘decision on whether the third-country nation-
al or stateless person be granted refugee or subsidiary protection status by virtue 
of Directive 2011/95/EU and which is no longer subject to a remedy within the 
framework of Chapter V of this Directive, irrespective of whether such remedy 
has the effect of allowing applicants to remain in the Member States concerned 
pending its outcome’.42 Chapter V of the Asylum Procedures Directive deals with 
appeal procedures and contains the right to an effective remedy. According to 
Article 46(1) of this chapter, asylum seekers have the right to an effective reme-
dy before a court or tribunal against decisions taken on their application. This 
chapter does not contain a right to a remedy in two instances. A restrictive read-
ing of the term ‘final decision’ would therefore be that a final decision has been 
taken if a court or tribunal, of first instance, has reviewed the decision of the 
authorities on the application for asylum or if the asylum seeker has not made 
use of a possible appeal against this decision. In this reading, asylum seekers 
who appeal to a higher national court or authority do not fall under the scope of 
the directive. A wider reading of the term ‘final decision’ is also possible. In that 
case ‘a remedy within the framework of Chapter V’ of the Asylum Procedures 
Directive should be understood more broadly and ‘final decision’ would mean a 
decision without further appeal. In that case, a decision on the asylum applica-
tion should only be considered ‘final’ if all domestic remedies have been ex-
                                                                      
40  CJEU 27 September 2012, C-179/11 (Cimade and GISTI). 
41  The CJEU did not clarify the difference between ‘lodging’ and ‘making’ an application.  
42  Art. 2(e) Directive 2013/32/EU.  
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hausted. This latter interpretation would solve problems of interpretation when 
the higher court refers back to the court of first instance.  
In the context of ‘Dublin’ procedures, when a Member State calls upon an-
other Member State to take charge of or to take back an asylum seeker, the 
CJEU has ruled that only the actual transfer of the asylum seeker by the request-
ing Member State brings an end to the examination of the application for asylum 
in that Member State and should therefore be seen as the ‘final decision’. The 
CJEU ruled this in a case about Directive 2003/9/EC and based this interpretation 
on the general scheme and purpose of this Directive and on the observance of 
human rights.43 This wide interpretation by the CJEU of the term ‘final decision’ 
in the context of Dublin procedures is an argument in favour of the wider reading 
of this term in general.  
Since international courts or committees are clearly not remedies within the 
framework of the Procedures Directive, and no ‘appeal’ can be lodged against 
national decisions with these bodies, asylum seekers who have exhausted do-
mestic remedies and who lodge a complaint with an international court or com-
mittee have received a ‘final decision’ on their asylum application and, conse-
quently, do not fall under the personal scope of the directive. 
3.4 Allowed to Remain on the Territory 
A final condition that needs to be fulfilled in order to fall under the personal 
scope of the Directive is to be allowed to remain on the territory. Again, the Di-
rective does not contain further provisions on this condition. According to Article 
2(p) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, ‘remain in the Member State’ means ‘to 
remain in the territory, including at the border or in transit zones, of the Member 
State in which the application for international protection has been made or is 
being examined’. Hence, the border and the transit zone of an airport must be 
considered to form part of a Member State’s territory. The question remains, 
however, as to when an asylum seeker is ‘allowed’ to remain on the territory. To 
answer this question, a distinction should be made between the procedure in 
first instance and the appeal procedure. 
Pursuant to Article 9(1) of the Asylum Procedures Directive, an asylum seek-
er is allowed to remain in the Member State until the determining authority has 
made a decision in accordance with the procedures at first instance set out in 
Chapter III. Chapter III of the Asylum Procedures Directive contains rules and 
guarantees for different kind of procedures and applications, such as accelerated 
procedures, inadmissible and unfounded applications, subsequent applications 
and border procedures. Accordingly, asylum seekers are allowed to remain on 
the territory, and fall under the personal scope of Directive 2013/33, in all these 
situations, until a decision in first instance has been taken. The CJEU confirmed 
in Arslan that an asylum seeker has the right to remain in the territory of the 
                                                                      
43  CJEU 27 September 2012, C-179/11 (Cimade and GISTI), paras 51-58.  
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Member State concerned ‘at least until his application has been rejected at first 
instance’.44 
Article 9(2) of the Asylum Procedures Directive states, however, that Mem-
ber States may make an exception to the right to remain where they will surren-
der or extradite an asylum seeker or where an asylum seeker makes a subse-
quent application referred to in Article 41. Article 41(1) stipulates that Member 
States may make an exception from the right to remain on the territory where 
an asylum seeker: 
 
a) has lodged a first subsequent application, which is not further examined 
pursuant to Article 40(5), merely in order to delay or frustrate the enforce-
ment of a decision which would result in his or her imminent removal from 
that Member State; or  
b) makes another subsequent application in the same Member State, following 
a final decision considering a first subsequent application inadmissible pur-
suant to Article 40(5) or after a final decision to reject that application as un-
founded. 
 
In addition, this article provides that Member States may make such an excep-
tion only where the determining authority considers that a return decision will 
not lead to direct or indirect refoulement in violation of that Member State’s 
international and Union obligations. A subsequent decision that is not further 
examined will be considered inadmissible pursuant to Article 40(5). Since an 
inadmissibility decision is a decision in first instance, the end of the right to re-
main on the territory seems to follow directly from Article 9(1) of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. Article 41(1)(a) seems therefore to be rather superfluous 
for this stage of the procedure.45 The exception mentioned in Article 41(1)(b) is 
of relevance for this stage. This provision stipulates that Member States may 
deny the right to remain to asylum seekers who make a further subsequent ap-
plication, following a subsequent application that has been declared inadmissi-
ble or unfounded, irrespective of whether that further subsequent application 
will be further examined or not. This means that asylum seekers who make a 
third or further asylum application in the same Member State, after their second 
application has been declared inadmissible or unfounded, do not have the right 
to remain on the territory pending the decision in first instance on their applica-
tion and consequently, do not fall under the personal scope of Directive 2013/ 
33/EU.  
The Asylum Procedures Directive also provides for a right to remain on the 
territory pending the appeal procedure. On the basis of Article 46(5-8) of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive, asylum seekers who lodge an appeal against the 
                                                                      
44  CJEU 30 May 2013, C-534/11 (Arslan), para 48. 
45  As Art 9(1) only obliges Member States to allow asylum seekers to remain on the territory 
‘until the determining authority has made a decision in accordance with the procedures at 
first instance set out in Chapter III’. An inadmissibility decision on the basis of Article 40 is 
such a decision.  
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rejection of their application generally have the right to remain on the territory 
pending the outcome of the remedy or, in certain specified cases, until a court or 
tribunal has ruled whether or not the applicant may remain on the territory 
pending this period. This latter rule applies for example when an application is 
declared inadmissible or manifestly unfounded in an accelerated asylum proce-
dure. Under certain circumstances, Member States may derogate from this lat-
ter right to remain in the case of a (further) subsequent application. The same 
conditions apply as with regard to the possibility to derogate from the right to 
remain with regard to subsequent applications pending the procedure in first 
instance.46 This means that generally, asylum seekers who lodge an appeal 
against the rejection of their application must be allowed to remain on the terri-
tory until a court or tribunal has considered, at least, their request to stay on the 
territory pending the outcome of their appeal. Only in case of a subsequent ap-
plication that is merely lodged in order to delay or frustrate the enforcement of a 
decision which would result in his or her imminent removal from that Member 
State and that will not be further examined or in case of a further subsequent 
application, after the first subsequent application is declared inadmissible or 
unfounded, asylum seekers do not have the right to remain on the territory 
pending this court procedure, and will not, therefore, fall under the personal 
scope of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
3.5 Concluding Remarks 
All of the above means that a number of categories of asylum seekers who are 
still awaiting a (court) decision on their asylum application do not fall under the 
personal scope of Directive 2013/33. First of all, it could be argued that asylum 
seekers who have only stated their intention to apply for asylum to the authori-
ties but who have not yet been registered as such by the authorities, while the 
authorities did not yet exceed the registration deadline, do not yet fall under the 
Directive’s personal scope. Secondly, Member States may choose to exclude two 
categories of asylum seekers from the right to remain on their territory pending 
the procedure in first instance and, consequently, from the personal scope of 
Directive 2013/33. These two categories are asylum seekers who lodge a further 
subsequent application after their second asylum application has been declared 
inadmissible or unfounded and asylum seekers who will be surrendered or extra-
dited. Thirdly, a court or tribunal may rule on (and, hence, may deny) the right to 
remain on the territory during the appeal stage in certain specified circumstanc-
es.47 Finally, asylum seekers who lodge a complaint with an international court 
or committee, or, arguably, who lodge a further domestic appeal against the 
rejection of their application do not fall under the personal scope of Directive 
2013/33, since they have already received a ‘final decision’ on their application. 
The Cimade and GISTI case indicates that the CJEU might give a broader def-
inition of the Directive’s personal scope. As mentioned earlier, the CJEU held in 
                                                                      
46  Art. 41(2)(c) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
47  See Art 47(6) and (7) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
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this case that asylum seekers for whom another Member State is responsible on 
the basis of the Dublin Regulation fall under the personal scope of the Reception 
Conditions Directive until they have actually been transferred to the responsible 
Member State. The CJEU based this conclusion on the fact that for such asylum 
seekers, a ‘final decision’ on their application has not yet been taken. The CJEU, 
however, failed to address the question whether these asylum seekers are still 
allowed to remain on the territory of the Member State in which they have 
lodged their asylum application. Since the CJEU referred to the general scheme 
and purpose of the Directive and to the observance of human rights as argu-
ments for this interpretation, this could indicate that the CJEU is, more general-
ly, of the opinion that asylum seekers fall under the personal scope of the Di-
rective until they have received a final decision on their application.  
4. SATURATION OF RECEPTION NETWORKS 
When the number of arriving asylum seekers significantly increases in a Member 
State, there is a risk that the general reception facilities that the Member State 
has in place for asylum seekers become overcrowded or even completely full. 
The Directive allows Member States to react to such a saturation of the recep-
tion network in (only) two ways.  
The first option is laid down in Article 18(9). This Article mentions explicitly 
the situation that ‘housing capacities normally available are temporarily ex-
hausted’. In that case, Member States may, exceptionally, ‘set modalities for 
material reception conditions different from those provided for in this Article’. 
The possibility of departing from the obligations laid down in Article 18 is further 
conditioned by the requirement to have a ‘duly justified case’ to deviate and to 
apply these exceptions for as short as possible. Article 18 provides further rules 
when accommodation is provided in kind. It stipulates, for example, in paragraph 
1 that where housing is provided in kind, it should take one or a combination of 
the following forms: 
 
a. ‘Premises used for the purpose of housing applicants during the examination 
of an application for international protection made at the border or in transit 
zones; 
b. Accommodation centres which guarantee an adequate standard of living; 
c. Private housing, flats, hotels or other premises adapted for housing appli-
cants.’  
 
Accordingly, asylum seekers can be housed in all kinds of premises, as long as 
these premises are specifically adapted for or used for the housing of asylum 
seekers. With reference to Article 18(9), however, Member States can house 
asylum seekers in premises that are not specifically meant for or adapted for 
housing asylum seekers. The current situation shows that many Member States 
do indeed use this possibility and accommodate asylum seekers in various forms 
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of emergency shelters, such as (army) tents, municipal evacuation shelters, or 
sports halls.48 
Article 18(9) gives the possibility to temporarily depart from all rules laid 
down in Article 18. As a result, if normally available housing capacities are tem-
porarily exhausted, Member States can also deviate from the requirement to 
take into consideration gender and age-specific concerns of asylum seekers 
when housing them;49 to ensure that transfers of asylum seekers to another 
reception facility only take place when necessary;50 and to ensure that reception 
centre personnel are adequately trained.51 
The second option that Member States have is to provide for accommoda-
tion in the form of financial allowances. This option is not limited to the situation 
of saturation of reception networks. Member States can under all circumstances 
choose between providing accommodation in kind, as financial allowances or in 
vouchers, as long as they ensure that the material reception conditions ‘provide 
an adequate standard of living for applicants, which guarantees their subsistence 
and protects their physical and mental health’.52 
In Saciri,53 the CJEU ruled that if Member States choose to provide for ac-
commodation in the form of financial allowances, the amount of these allow-
ances must be such that asylum seekers are actually and effectively able to ob-
tain housing, if necessary on the private rental market. In addition, housing 
should immediately be available when asylum seekers make their application for 
asylum. In this case, the reception facilities for asylum seekers in Belgium were 
overloaded, as a result of which asylum seekers were referred to bodies in the 
general public assistance system. The Saciri family was referred to such a body, 
but was unable to find housing or to pay the rent at the private rental market. 
The CJEU held that Member States have a certain margin of discretion as re-
gards the methods by which they provide the material reception conditions and 
that they may use, therefore, bodies of the general public assistance system as 
intermediary. However, Member States should ensure that those bodies provide 
the minimum standards laid down in the Directive; ‘saturation of the reception 
networks not being a justification for any derogation from meeting those stand-
ards.’54 
                                                                      
48  See for example Sweden (http://www.migrationsverket.se/English/Private-individuals/ 
Protection-and-asylum-in-Sweden/Nyheter/2016-02-05-Great-need-for-housing-despite-
fewer-applicants.html); the Netherlands (https://www.government.nl/topics/asylum-poli-
cy/contents/asylum-procedure/reception-asylumseeker); Germany (http://www.asylum-
ineurope.org/reports/country/germany/reception-conditions/access-forms-reception-
conditions/types-accommodation); France (http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/ 
country/France/reception-conditions/access-and-forms-reception-conditions/types).  
49  Art. 18(3) of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
50  Art. 18(6) of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
51  Art. 18(7) of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
52  Art. 17(2) Directive 2013/33/EU.  
53  CJEU 27 February 2014, C-79/13 (Saciri).  
54  Para. 50.  
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The Saciri judgment was positively received by some commentators as an 
extension of asylum seekers’ rights under the Directive. The judgment would 
display a ‘robust upholding of asylum seekers’ rights’55 or an ‘extension of the 
protection scope of the Directive’.56 In my view, however, the Court answers to 
the preliminary questions follow logically from the wording of the definition of 
‘material reception benefits’ in the Directive, which explicitly includes housing, 
and the lack of a possibility to reduce or withdraw reception benefits in case of 
saturation of the reception facilities.57 
To conclude, if the reception capacity in Member States becomes overload-
ed due to an increase in asylum applications, Member States can either tempo-
rarily provide for forms of emergency shelter that do not need to comply with all 
the rules laid down in the Directive for the provision of housing in kind, or they 
can provide asylum seekers with enough financial benefits in order for them to 
effectively and immediately find their own housing. Not providing any kind of 
housing to asylum seekers, even temporarily, is not in conformity with the Di-
rective. When adopting the Directive, the Member States have, therefore, sub-
jected themselves to an important, result-oriented obligation; an obligation that 
is more far reaching then the more perform-oriented obligation to provide for 
housing in human rights treaties, which generally leaves room for budgetary 
constraints and for progressive realization.58 
5. RELEVANCE OF THE LAPSE OF TIME 
The length of the asylum procedure can vary widely, both within a Member 
State, as well as among Member States. When large numbers of asylum seekers 
apply for asylum simultaneously, the length of the procedure can increase signif-
icantly. The Asylum Procedures Directive holds that, generally, Member States 
should conclude the procedure in first instance within six months from the lodg-
ing of an application.59 However, while Member States may provide for acceler-
                                                                      
55  B. Venkata, ‘Destitute asylum seekers - what are member states’ obligations? Case Com-
ment: federaal agentschap v Saciri, available at: http://eutopialaw.com/2014/03/04/desti-
tute-asylum-seekers-what-are-member-states-obligations-case-comment-federaal-
agentschap-v-saciri-c-7913/.  
56  M. Enquist Källgren, ‘A worthy standard of living for asylum seekers and Belgian catch-
22’, available at: http://luxembourgweekly.blogspot.nl/2014/03/c-7913-saciri-migration-
law.html. 
57  See my case comment in EHRC 2014/95. See also S. Peers, ‘The CJEU secures asylum 
seekers’ right to family housing’, available at: http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2014/02/ 
what-obligations-do-member-states-have.html. As discussed in these case comments, 
the CJEU does broaden Member States’ obligations a bit with regard to the obligation to 
protect family unity.  
58  Cf. Art. 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Art. 31(2) 
of the European Social Charter (Revised).  
59  Art. 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
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ated procedures on a number of grounds,60 they may also extend the time limit 
with another nine months where complex legal and factual issues are involved in 
the individual case; the delay is attributable to the asylum seeker; or, a large 
number of asylum seekers simultaneously apply for asylum.61 In addition, by way 
of exception, Member States may exceed the time limits by a maximum of three 
months ‘where necessary in order to ensure an adequate and complete examina-
tion of the application for international protection’.62 Hence, Member States 
may, under certain, rather widely defined, circumstances take 18 months to de-
cide on the asylum application. Alongside possibilities for extending and exceed-
ing time limits, Member States may postpone the procedure in first instance 
‘due to an uncertain situation in the country of origin which is expected to be 
temporary’.63 In any event, the procedure in first instance should be concluded 
within 21 months from the lodging of the application.64 These time limits only 
apply to the procedure in first instance. If the asylum application is rejected, the 
procedure in first instance is usually followed by an appeal procedure, some-
times in two instances. The Asylum Procedures Directive does not contain time 
limits for the conclusion of this part of the procedure; it only allows Member 
States to lay down time limits in their domestic legislation.65 Accordingly, an 
asylum procedure that takes many months or years is not in violation of, nor 
unforeseen by EU law.  
The Reception Conditions Directive does take a possible long duration of 
asylum procedures into account by providing for an (albeit rather limited) accre-
tion in rights trough the passage of time. For example, Article 15(1) of the di-
rective holds that Member States should ensure that asylum seekers have access 
to the labour market no later than nine months from the lodging of the applica-
tion. This obligation, however, only applies if a first instance decision by the 
competent authority has not been taken within these nine months and the delay 
cannot be attributed to the applicant. If the authorities reject the application 
within nine months (or if a delay on the decision can be attributed to the asylum 
seeker) Member States may deny asylum seekers access to the labour market 
pending possible appeal procedures. The Directive, therefore, under certain 
conditions still allows Member States to deny access to the labour market pend-
ing the entire asylum procedure, which may take years. If, however, the authori-
ties are unable to decide on the application within nine months – which may 
happen more often now with the increase in asylum applications and which is 
allowed for under the Asylum Procedures Directive – Member States should 
ensure access to the labour market. Member States may set conditions for 
granting access and may give priority to Union citizens and to legally resident 
                                                                      
60  Art. 31(8) of Directive 2013/32/EU. 
61  Art. 31(3) of Directive 2013/32/EU. 
62  Idem.  
63  Art. 31(4) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
64  Art. 31(5) of Directive 2013/32/EU. Note that these time limits should only be transposed 
into domestic law by 20 July 2018 (art. 51(2) Directive 2013/32/EU).  
65  Art. 46(10) of Directive 2013/32/EU.  
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third-country nationals, but should ensure ‘effective’ access.66 In addition, once 
access to the labour market is provided, it may not be withdrawn during appeals 
procedures, if the appeal has suspensive effect.67 
Another example of a provision where the passage of time plays a role is Ar-
ticle 14 on education. Article 14(2) provides that access to the education system 
for minors may be postponed, but for no longer than three months from the 
lodging of the application. In addition, Article 14(1) stipulates that once access to 
secondary education is provided, it may not be withdrawn for the sole reason 
that the minor has reached the age of majority.  
Other provisions do not refer to the passage of time, where this would have 
made sense in view of relevant state practice. For example, providing material 
reception benefits entirely in kind (apart from a daily expenses allowance); hous-
ing asylum seekers in accommodation centres; deciding on the residence of asy-
lum seekers; and making provision of the material benefits subject to actual 
residence in a specific place; all of these lack a specific time limit. Asylum seekers 
may be accommodated in (large scale) accommodation centres and may be 
subjected to an obligation to live there throughout the asylum procedure. Time 
limits on the provision of in kind benefits and/or accommodation in large scale 
accommodation centres do exist in state practice. For example, in Belgium, asy-
lum seekers can apply for a transfer to individual accommodation after they have 
lived for four months in a collective accommodation centre, provided their appli-
cation has not been rejected.68 In Germany, regular social assistance benefits are 
provided to asylum seekers after 15 months of receiving more limited and usual-
ly in kind benefits under the Asylum Seekers’ Benefits Act.69 
6.  CONCLUSION 
The Directive refers only once to the situation that Member States receive many 
asylum applications; if the normally available housing capacities for asylum 
seekers are temporarily exhausted, Member States may, in duly justified cases 
and for as short as possible, deviate from the specific safeguards laid down in the 
Directive for housing that is provided in kind. The Asylum Procedures Directive 
provides for an extension of the deadline for registration and for an extension of 
                                                                      
66  Art. 15(2) of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
67  Art. 15(3) of Directive 2013/33/EU.  
68  Art. 12(1) Wet betreffende de opvang van asielzoekers en van bepaalde andere categorieën 
van vreemdelingen. After a negative decision, asylum seekers can still apply for a transfer 
if they have lodged an appeal with the Council of State that has been declared admissible. 
See also: http://www.asylumineurope.org/sites/default/files/report-download/aida_be_ 
update.iv__0.pdf.  
Due to the increase in asylum applications, these transfers have been put on hold. Since 
August 2015, asylum applicants with a high chance of receiving international protection 
(e.g. Syrians) are immediately assigned to an individual accommodation structure.  
69  § 2(1) Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (AsylbLG). See also: http://www.asylumineurope.org/ 
sites/default/files/report-download/aida_de_update.iv__0.pdf, p. 50.  
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the deadline to conclude the procedure in first instance when a large number of 
asylum seekers apply simultaneously for asylum, which (arguably) affects the 
start and duration of Member States’ obligations under the Directive. Apart from 
this, the Directive leaves no room for exceptions based on high numbers of asy-
lum applications, as has been explicitly confirmed by the CJEU. The Directive 
does provide for a number of important rights for asylum seekers. For example, 
they have a right to be provided with housing or enough money to be able to 
effectively obtain housing themselves and, if they have not received a first in-
stance decision within nine months, to have effective access to the labour mar-
ket. It is, therefore, important to establish the precise personal scope of the Di-
rective.  
In its evaluation report regarding the 2003 Directive, the Commission con-
cluded that the objective of creating a level playing field in the area of reception 
conditions had not been reached.70 Even though the 2013 recast of the Directive 
changed little regarding Member States’ obligations, it would now be possible to 
conclude differently, due to changed circumstances and Member States’ reac-
tions to the increase in asylum applications. Although there remains room for 
improvement with regard to the content of the recast Directive,71 in the light of 
the current developments, the focus should first be on the correct implementa-
tion of this Directive. Other contributions in this book will critically examine this.  
 
                                                                      
70  European Commission, Report from the Commission to the Council and to the European 
Parliament on the application of Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down mini-
mum standards for the reception of asylum seekers, COM(2007) 745 final. 
71  For example from the perspective of state practice as mentioned above in para. 5 or from 
the perspective of Member States’ obligations under international refugee law, social se-
curity law and human rights law. See: L. Slingenberg, The Reception of Asylum Seekers un-
der International Law. Between Sovereignty and Equality, Oxford: Hart Publishing 2014.  
